For only seven hours, on
Sunday December 7, 1975, through the biggest airborne operation in ABRI's
history, the city of Dili, East Timor, was taken over. 1st Group Kopassandha (Army Special Forces) and 18th
Brigade/Kostrad (Army Strategic Reserve Command) Airborne, mostly from 502
Battalion/Raiders, East Java, parachuted from nine Air Force C-130B Hercules
At about 05.00 WITA, BTP-5 (Battalion Landing Team)/Marine Infantry, tip toed at Alor Village's beach. With the support of gun fire from Indonesian Navy
warship, BTP-5 headed the big plan of taking over the city of Dili, December 7,
1975. The operation was the continuation of "Operation Komodo" by Bakin at the
beginning of 1975, to anticipate more political problems in
Timor Loro Sae (East Land of the Rising Sun).
This prolonged political euphoria forces Indonesia to step up the operation into
a limited Sandhi Yudha operation (combat intelligence) with the code name
"Operasi Flamboyan (Operation Poinciana).
This operation led by Colonel Dading Kalbuadi, with the Army Special Forces as 1st
Group operation's core strike force that have placed 2nd Combat Detachment at
the border since October 1975, will later change into
"Operation Seroja" (Operation Lotus).
Dili's take over, preceded by this amphibious operation, was decided by
Minister of Defense/Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces General Maraden
Panggabean, December 4 in Kupang. The operation itself was executed through
considerations and field analysis after observing Fretilin troop's movement.
Indonesia's firmness was also based on the Timor
Portugal people's wish to integrate with Indonesia. The attitude represented by
four parties; Apodeti (Associacao Popular Democratica de
Timor), UDT (Uniao Democratica de
Timorense), KOTA (Klibur Oan Timor
Aswin), and Trabalista, known as the Balibo Declaration, November
30, 1975. This attitude also competes against the one-sided declaration of East
Timor Democratic Republic by Fretilin (Fronte Revolucionaria de Timor Leste
Indepedente), two days before.
Before the struggle of Dili, Fretilin has been involved in a shoot out with
ABRI troops in the struggle of Batugede Fort (October 7). Another reason, the rise
of border violations interspersed with cattle thefts by Fretilin in Belu Regency,
East Nusa Tenggara. The rising violations since June 1975 were frequently caught
red handed by ABRI, which caused shootouts. Casualties started to fall.
Since October 1, Operation Lotus Joint Task Command (Kogasgab) has
detected two Portuguese Navy frigate warships off Timor. Unfortunately, the morning of
December 7, the two ships started to approach Dili's offshore. "They have anchored
nearer to Atauro Island, because that was where the escapee Portuguese government
from Timor was situated," said Hendro
Subroto. It might be a coincidence, at the straits separating Atauro island and Alor
island, three Hercules in arrow formation one formation with there planes would
make abeam maneuvers (the plane's position is 90 degrees towards a checkpoint at the
left or right side of the plane).
At the end of December 6 1975, at Iswahyudi Air Force Base, Madiun,
East Java, unusually, hundreds of heavily armed troops milled about. Some wore
American made T-10 parachutes, while others holds Soviet made AK-47 assault rifles. At
the apron, nine 31st Squadron heavy transport C-130B Hercules, were ready to
take-off. Several aircrews took the opportunity to take final check up before airborne.
The nine planes arrived at Iswahyudi Air Force Base that afternoon.
Lieutenant Colonel Pilot Suakadirul said, he got
the order to depart for Iswahyudi Air Force Base on Friday, December 5, from
Colonel Pilot Susetyo, Operation Lotus Air Unit Commander. The order: after Friday
prayer, all members of the 31st Squadron should be combat ready. None was allowed to
go home. "I didn't know the direction of the order at that time. But I can guess by
looking at the development of the situation," remembers Air Vice Marshal
(Ret) Suakadirul.
In the classified order, 31th Squadron Commander was asked to get 12
planes ready to airlift battalion of paratroopers. "So I have to get 12 crew sets ready.
Pilots, co-pilots, navigators, flight engineers,
radio telegraphists, loadmasters and his assistants. That's about 120 people," he
said. Incidentally two of his planes were in service, so only ten planes can be readied.
For the pilots, Suakadirul purporsely stationed two senior pilots Lieutnant Colonel
Pilot Siboen and Colonel Pilot Suhardjo. "As role models."
So, the next day, nine C-130s left from Halim Perdanakusuma to Iswahyudi.
Three of them transported the Army Special Forces. That afternoon, in
Madiun, Suakadirul received explanation that there will be airborne operation in Dili, and
his fleet will transport one parachute battalion. "One plane carried 100 people,"
explained Hendro, the journalist who covered the incident. On the same day
in Timor, 403rd Battalion/Kostrad Raiders arrived offshore Tailaco with the
Landing Ship Tank (LST) KRI Teluk Bone. In the afternoon, followed by BTP-5/1st
Marine Brigade Infantry entered the LST for the preparations of the amphibious landing
in Dili at 05.00 the next day.
December 6, at 23.50, flight leader Lieutnant Colonel Pilot Suakadirul,
started the operation by flying T-1308 Hercules.
In succession, in the dark of night, eight planes left Iswahyudi Air Force Base runway.
The planes moved towards Ponorogo and Denpasar, nine planes started the
arrow formation with the plane's jet exhaust and take-off light as guide.
The nature of the operation was a surprise attack. The nine Hercules
formations were code named Rajawali (Condor)
Flight. To maintain secrecy, radio silence was adopted during the flight.
Communication between pilots was done through
Morse code. The planes kept gaining altitude until they reached 22,000 feet with the
speed of 280 knots. Above Denpasar, the flight leader sent a morse code to Ngurah
Rai Airport's air traffic control(ATC) informing that Rajawali abeam Denpasar.
Through Denpasar, Suakadirul contacted Penfui Airport, Kupang, to inform Rajawali
flight's position at several checkpoints to Operation Lotus Command Headquarters on
KRI Ratulangi submarine's tender ship.
The slowest T-1308 was chosen as flight leader so that the other planes as
wingmen can easily adjust their flight formation. Acting as wingmen were Lieutenant
Colonel Pilot Sudji Harsono (left) and Colonel Pilot Suhardjo (right). Lieutenant
Colonel Pilot Siboen (leader) flew the second
arrow formation, two miles behind were Lieutenant Colonel Pilot O H Wello (left)
and Lieutenant Colonel Pilot Sukandar (right). The third arrow was led by
Lieutenant Colonel Pilot Masulili consisted of
Major Pilot Achlid Muchlas/Major Pilot Sudiyarso (left) and Major Pilot Murdowo (right).
Suakadirul illustrates; it was very quiet on the planes. Their breaths got
heavier, understandably, this was the first
airborne operation in Dili and the biggest for Hercules in ABRI's history. Waiting
was obviously boring. Especially when the target was a war zone. The flight to Dili
was estimated to take 4 hours and 50 minutes. Each plane carried 42,000 pound of
JP-4 fuel, enough for 10 hours and 30 minutes flight.
The broad outline, the airdrop operation to take over Dili from Fretilin's
hand was done in three sorties. The first sortie, with Dili as the target, consisted of
Army Special Force 1st Group led by Lieutenant Colonel (Inf.) Soegito and 501st
Airborne Infantry Battalion under the command of Lieutenant Colonel (Inf.) Matrodji.
The second sortie, from Penfui Airport, Kupang, was 502nd Battalion under Major
(Inf.) Warsito will follow, the target was Komoro. Especially for the Red Beret (Army
Special Force), this operation was preceded by Denpur-1 (Combat Detachment),
also called Nanggala-5, under the command of Major (Inf.) Atang Sutisna. The third
sortie was also airlifted from Kupang.
Lieutenant Colonel Soegito divided Nangggala-5 into three teams. Teams A
led by Major Atang Sutisna, in charge of taking the governor's office. Team B led by
First Lieutenant Atang Sanjaya, in charges of taking over Dili Harbour. While Team
C led by First Lieutenant Luhut Panjaitan, in charge of taking Dili's airport. All
three teams were spread in four front Hercules, with the consideration that if one got
problems or hit by enemy fire, the team can depend on the other planes. That
means, the operation must continue.
The troops of the second and third sorties that will be flown from
Kupang were from Jakarta and East Java. Because of TNI AU's limited ability in air
transportation support, troops transportation to Kupang used Garuda Indonesian
Airway's planes. Garuda bridged troop transportation from Halim Perdanakusuma
and Iswahyudi using 17 Fokker F-28 and four Fokker F-27
Friendship. Garuda's managing director, Wiweko Supono, directly
supervised this bridging operation.
To maintain the element of surprise, obviously the operation was not only
based on the knowledge of the droping zone. Airstrike also played their part. Irian
Jaya's take over achieved air superiority, because it was supported by fighter planes.
Bombers and transport planes must get also close air support.
On the other hand, for Dili, air fire support (AFS) was a problem. This
was caused by the grounding of all P-51
Mustang of 3rd Squadron/Tactical Fighter
after a series of accidents, killing, among other, Major Pilot Sriyono. While advanced
training aircrafts T-33 T-Bird and
ex-Australian F-86 Sabre, were not yet armed. Of
the seven B-26 Invader bomber of 2nd Squadron/Tactical Bomber, only two were
serviceable. There were only two pilots still qualified to fly these WW II veterans.
They were Lieutenant Colonel Pilot Danendra (Penfui Air force Base Commander)
and Major Pilot Soemarsono, called to duty from Pelita Air Service.
During the Vietnam War the United States realized the importance of AFS.
Not surprisingly, later, General John P McConnel proposed the modification of
C-47 into a gunship. The Dakota was later popularly known as the
Gooney Bird. It was also now called AC-47 it used to
be FC-47. Twenty aircrafts equipped with three 7.62 mm machine guns at the
sides, were used by USAF during the Vietnam war aside from AC-130
Spectre Gunship.
Inspired by the popular gunship, two C-47 Dakotas of
2nd Squadron/TNI AU's Light Transport, were transformed into
AC-47 gunship. Mechanics and technicians of 10th Aircraft Maintenance Depot,
Bandung, installed three 0.50-mm caliber machine guns to each planes. Firing test were
done along Timor Portugal border in September 1975. Two B-26s and two AC-47s
were completed, ready to provide AFS for the airborne operation on the December 7.
Go!
The planes keep moving in silence. Occasionally, the sound of Morse
code breaks the silence. On the east of Flores, Rajawali Flight slowly descends to
5.000 feet while arranging the dropping formation. Directly above Alor Island at
7.000 feet, the red light by the door started to flash and the bells rang three times
to signal the troops to get ready.
Ten minutes left for jumping time nearing green light. Kopassandha and 18th
Brigade/Kostrad Airborne soldiers attached their hooks at the end of the straps on
the metal cable through the cabin. Quickly, backpack, weapons, and individual
equipment' were straighened up. There was almost no noise. Everyone kept silent
with his or her own duties.
Abeam Atauro, the planes reached 5,000 feet. Because the radar was tuned to
the weather, Suakadirul was shocked to see two Portuguese frigates
Joao Roby and Alfonso de
Alburquerque anchored offshore Atauro. "There was no
information on the two ships equipped with radar
and sonar anchored at Atauro," protested Suakadirul. Strange. Even though
KRI Ratulangi has passed Joao Roby at Timor territorial waters, October 23. What
was more surprising, the existence of the ship, which has 3 100-mm guns, has
already been known since October 1. "That's
what I didn't understand," answer Suakadirul.
The doors at both sides of the planes started to open. The speed was reduced
to 110 knots. "I said we were at 5,000 feet. The yellow light was on, then
depressurized," said Suakadirul. The time left
to the dropping zone was four minutes. Slowly, the horizontal distance between planes
was shortened to about 300 feet (about 100 meters). So was the vertical distance
between planes, only a 50 feet distance. "I was at an altitude of 900 feet,"
said Suakadirul. So if you calculate to the last plane, the altitude reached 1,250 feet.
Approaching Dili's shore, with reference to Tanjung Fatukama, Rajawali
flight turned to the right headed towards the center of Dili. To be able to fly the
planes at 110 knots, according to Suakadirul, the flaps were lowered about 50 percent.
For Suakadirul, Dili was nothing new. On 1970, this Chekoslovakian graduate
frequently traveled Zamrud's Dakota with Denpasar, Rembiga, Sumbawa, Kupang, and Dili
as his route for RON (remain overnight). Meanwhile the navigator said, "two
minutes ahead."
Nine planes appeared from behind the hills without B-26 and AC-47 escorts.
The bell rang for about five seconds after the Hercules T-1308 flew across the West
Side of a fishermen's village. Suakadirul's watch showed the time as 05.45, at the exact
time the yellow light turned to green. "My
throat suddenly went dry," he said.
Only seconds to 05.45, the jumping master shouted, "Ready?" Followed by
the order, "Stand by the door!" Several
seconds later, the jumping master shouted louder. "Go!"
Taking 260 degrees direction or almost west of the line paralleled to Dr.
Antonio de Carvalho Street in the middle of Dili, the first troop jumped from the Hercules
T-1308. Later hundreds, from Kopassandha and Kostrad, jumped from every plane.
On the fourth count, T-10 parachutes with their olive green color mushroomed
over Dili. Because Fretilin's triangle communication between
Dili-Atauro-Portueguese frigates was very good, the firts
sortie's jump has lost the element of surprise.
The troops were fired upon sporadically from the ground. Fretilin's tracers were like
lightning bugs in the dark of night.
The paratroopers, still floating in the air, return fire. So, that day there was
a fierce battle between airborne troops with the Fretilin. Several months earlier
according to Hendro, 15,000 small arms left by Portugal were distributed by Fretilin
to arm the people. In fact Fretilin was ready as soon as the lights was turned off at 03.00
at the exact time the marines started its amphibious operation supported by
TNI AL's gun fire. The Plessey radar of the two frigate ships was also obviously used
to warn the Fretilin.
You can imagine the life or death struggle of the airborne troops. Not all
arrived safely. Some landed at the roof of houses, stuck on a tree or fences. Those that
landed in the open became easy targets. With no time to get ready, they have already
engaged in battle with ex Brown Beret Tropaz, Portuguese soldiers. There was
absolutely no time to consolidate. The appointed
three teams, tried very hard to spread out and started the liberation operation of the
governor's office, harbor, and airport. Gun fire was heard everywhere. Even though
they have known of the arrival of Indonesian troops, Fretilin's army were scattered.
If they want to wait, Indonesia could gain advantage -with careful planning
because Fretilin never predicted Indonesia will strike from the air. They thought the
strike would be from the border.
Because at the time of the jump the planes were fired at, plus the added
obstacle of a 1,500 feet hill at the end of Dili's runway, Rajawali flight must turn to
the right towards the beach to fly back to Kupang. And because DZ was pretty
short and the jump interval too long actually it took only one minute 79 out of
720 soldiers got cancelled, including Team C leader First Lieutenant Luhut Panjaitan.
Fires from below not only hit the troops, but also the four Hercules. In fact, a
bullet that went through the plane's body hit and killed T-1312's loadmaster flown by
Lieutenant Colonel Wello, Warrant Officer Wardjijo. Suakadirul's plane was no
exception. Bullets damaged the navigation compass and auxiliary hydraulic pump.
Bullets also went through the cockpit's glass of Suakadirul's left side. A cup of coffee
that he put, was thrown to the front of the cockpit and wet his forehead. The
crew thought he was shot. Especially when they saw a thick liquid running down his
forehead. "Turns out it was just coffee."
The other two Hercules flown by Lieutenant Colonel Pilot Sudji Harsono
and Colonel Pilot Sukandar were also shot. The nine planes plus the 79 troops
continued the 48 minutes flight to Kupang. From Kupang, after checking the aircrafts
condition, the second sorties was continued using five Hercules. Komoro was
determined as DZ. Because four planes were not fit
to fly, half of 502nd Batallion's strength was not transported. At 07.45, the second
sortie jumped safely at Komoro because Fretilin was hit back to the hills south of
Dili. Suakadirul changed his plane to T-1305.
Wrong shot
Second sortie scrambled out of the plane. Unknown who gave the order,
when still floating in the air, more than 400 Green Berets showered then with
bullets and grenades. Like the first sortie, shoot-out broke out. It continued without
either party realizing they were on the same side.
The Marines that have beat back Fretilins along the coastline, were firing at
Kostrad troops. Luckily the Marines quickly initiated to stop the shorting waving "Red
and White". Even more lucky no casualities was reported.
Suakadirul found out about the miss understanding a while later. On their
arrival at Penfui, Rajawali flight readied the third sortie of the remaining Kostrad
paratroops jumpers to be dropped at the outskirts west of Dili. Afraid of repeating
second sortie's tragic mistake, Operation Lotus Headquarters Command decided
to cancel the third sortie.
After struggling from 06.00 till noon, Dili was eventually liberated. Fretilin
retreated to the hills south of Dili. Its leader escaped to Aileu. Lobato and Ramos
Horta took off to Australia. Only the former Tropaz has the guts to stay. In the
afternoon, December 7, the Indonesian government issued a statement that on that
day, at 12.30, Dili has been liberated by Apodeti, UDT, KOTA, and Trabalista helped
by Indonesian volunteers.
The next day casualities were counted. 35 Green Berets, mostly from
502nd Batallion/Raiders, including two majors and two captains were killed. From the
Red Berets, sixteen were shot and killed. Three more drowned at sea. Three that
was thought to be missing were found several months later. Team B leader, First
Lieutenant Atang Sanjaya, got hit by his AK-47 ammunition's fragments that exploded
after being hit by enemy fire. Unfortunately his superior, Major Atang Sutisna, got
shot and died. "Hit by a sniper",
explained Hendro. At Fretilin's side, there were
more casualties. Hendro Subroto recorded in his article in
Airforces magazine, 122 died and 365 apprehended. The operation
continued. Three days later, it was Baucau's turn to be
liberated.(Beny Adrian/Mouna)
